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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Medical student Jessica Ramsay sought testing 
accommodations for dyslexia and attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) from the National Board of 
Medical Examiners (“the Board”).  The Board denied her 
requests, and she sued under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”).  The District Court granted a preliminary 
injunction, requiring the Board to provide her 
accommodations.  We will affirm. 
 
I 
 
A 
 
 The Board administers the United States Medical 
Licensing Examination (“USMLE”).  The USMLE has three 
components, or “Steps,” that medical students must pass before 
they can apply for a medical license.  Step 1 is a computer-
based, multiple choice exam that assesses a student’s grasp of 
scientific concepts.  Students typically take Step 1 before their 
final year of medical school.  Step 2 has two parts: Clinical 
Knowledge (“CK”), a computer-based, multiple choice exam 
that assesses medical knowledge and clinical science, and 
Clinical Skills (“CS”) that assesses students in a clinical 
setting.  Step 2 must be taken before graduation.  Step 3 is a 
computer-based exam that assesses the application of medical 
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and scientific knowledge to the practice of medicine.  Step 3 
must be taken before applying for a medical license.     
 
 Ramsay, while a third-year medical student at Western 
Michigan University (“WMed”), requested an 
accommodation, namely extra testing time, for Step 1 and Step 
2 CK.  The basis of her request was that she had ADHD and 
dyslexia.  She submitted to the Board:  
 
• a diagnosis of ADHD and probable dyslexia by her 
family physician, Dr. Alan Smiy, made when she was 
an undergraduate; 
• records of accommodations provided by her 
undergraduate institution and by WMed; 
• evaluations from Charles Livingston, a licensed social 
worker, who administered several assessments that 
supported a diagnosis of ADHD and a likelihood of 
dyslexia and showed, in his opinion, that Ramsay had 
“relatively low attention and concentration and very 
low processing speed,” although “[h]er native 
intelligence has been some compensation for low 
abilities in the identified areas”; 
• her MCAT scores, taken without accommodations, 
placing her in the 67th and 31st percentiles for verbal 
reasoning and writing, respectively;  
• academic records and other standardized test scores, 
taken without accommodations, showing a high level 
of achievement; and 
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• a personal statement attesting that she struggled from 
an early age with maintaining concentration, reading, 
and writing, but that she achieved academic success 
through mitigating strategies, informal 
accommodations from teachers, and accommodations 
from her undergraduate and medical schools. 
The Board provided Ramsay’s materials to an outside 
reviewer, Dr. Stephen Zecker, who opined that Ramsay was 
not “substantially limited in functioning in a manner that 
warrants accommodations.”  App. 766.  The Board also 
reviewed Ramsay’s documentation and, noting her record of 
achievement without accommodations, concluded that the 
documents did not “demonstrate a record of chronic and 
pervasive problems with inattention, impulsivity, behavioral 
regulation, or distractibility that has substantially impaired 
[her] functioning during [her] development or currently.”  App. 
1126.  Based on Dr. Zecker’s recommendation and the Board’s 
review of Ramsay’s materials, the Board denied her request.   
 
Thereafter, Ramsay took Step 1 without 
accommodations in her third year, but she failed by one point.  
Because WMed requires students to pass Step 1 by the 
beginning of their fourth year, she took a leave of absence.    
 
Ramsay renewed her request for extra testing time and 
submitted an evaluation and test data from neuropsychologist 
Dr. Alan Lewandowski.  Dr. Lewandowski met with Ramsay, 
conducted assessments, found that she had abnormal 
functionalities in thinking, processing speed, attention, and 
sequencing, and concluded that she had ADHD.  Ramsay also 
submitted a letter from her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Bruce 
Ruekberg, who concurred with Mr. Livingston’s and Dr. 
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Lewandowski’s assessments, stating that she had abnormal 
scanning and processing speed that impaired her reading and 
written expression.  The Board denied her request for extra 
testing time, again concluding that she had not shown she was 
substantially limited in any functions as compared to most 
people.1   
 
Ramsay sought reconsideration of the Board’s denial.  
As additional support, she provided an evaluation by Dr. 
Robert D. Smith, a psychologist and neuropsychologist.  Dr. 
Smith met with Ramsay, reviewed her records, and performed 
similar assessments.   He reported that the assessments 
revealed that she had abnormally low abilities in processing 
information, writing, and reading, indicating dyslexia and 
ADHD.  Among other things, his testing revealed that Ramsay, 
as compared to others in her age group, was in the fourth 
percentile in reading comprehension and fluency, second 
percentile in word reading speed, and first percentile in oral 
reading fluency.   
 
The Board provided Ramsay’s file to outside expert Dr. 
Benjamin Lovett, who concluded that Ramsay did not show 
poor academic skills or impairments compared to the general 
population and thus lacked a condition that would warrant 
accommodations.  Based on Dr. Lovett’s recommendation and 
further review, the Board denied Ramsay’s request for 
reconsideration.   
 
 
1 The Board granted Ramsay’s requests for additional 
break time and a separate testing room as accommodations for 
migraines and deep vein thrombosis.    
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B 
 
 Ramsay sued the Board in May 2019, alleging that it 
had violated the ADA.2  The next month, WMed informed 
Ramsay that it could extend her leave only until March 2020, 
“with the expectation that [she] will sit for the USMLE Step 1 
exam in a manner that allows [her] to return to the WMed 
curriculum by that date.”  App. 1520.  WMed informed 
Ramsay that if she did not pass Step 1 and return by March 
2020, she would be dismissed or could voluntarily withdraw, 
but readmission would not be guaranteed.3  Ramsay accepted 
WMed’s conditional extension of leave.    
 
 Because Ramsay had to pass Step 1 to avoid dismissal, 
she sought a preliminary injunction to require the Board to 
grant her accommodations.  The District Court held a three-day 
evidentiary hearing featuring testimony from, among others, 
Ramsay, Dr. Smith, Dr. Zecker, and Dr. Lovett.  
 
For the reasons explained in its careful and thorough 
opinion, the District Court granted Ramsay a preliminary 
injunction and required the Board to provide Ramsay with 
double the testing time on Step 1, Step 2 CK, any written or 
reading portions of Step 2 CS, and Step 3.  Ramsay v. Nat’l 
 
2 Ramsay also alleged a Rehabilitation Act claim, 29 
U.S.C. § 794, but the parties agree that only her ADA claim is 
relevant to the preliminary injunction.    
3 The Board contends that Ramsay only had to take, not 
pass, Step 1 to remain enrolled in school.  Given that WMed 
students must pass Step 1 by the beginning of their fourth year, 
however, Ramsay could not continue into her fourth year at 
WMed without passing Step 1. 
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Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, No. 19-CV-2002, 2019 WL 7372508 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2019).  The Court found that all the experts 
were qualified, but that the testimony and reports of the experts 
who met with Ramsay were more persuasive.  Id. at *17.  
Those experts stated that their assessments and evaluations all 
showed that Ramsay had low reading, writing, and processing 
abilities.  Id. at *15-16.  The Court also found that the Board’s 
experts’ analyses contradicted applicable regulations by 
focusing too much on Ramsay’s academic achievements, 
substituting their own opinions for those of experts who met 
with Ramsay, and placing too demanding a burden on Ramsay.  
Id. at *17-18.  Based on this evidence and the governing law, 
the Court found that Ramsay had a disability under the ADA.  
Id. at *18. 
 
The Court also found that: (1) Ramsay established 
irreparable harm because she would likely be forced to 
withdraw from WMed if she could not take Step 1 with 
accommodations and pass, (2) the balance of equities tipped in 
her favor because granting her accommodations would not 
undermine the Board’s interests in fair and accurate testing, 
and (3) it was in the public interest for the ADA to be followed 
and to increase the number of physicians.  Id. at *18-19.  The 
Board appeals.4 
 
4 After the Board filed its appeal, Ramsay passed Step 1 
with accommodations.  This appeal, however, is not moot 
because (1) the District Court’s injunction extends to Steps 2 
and 3, which Ramsay has not yet taken, and (2) as to Step 1, if 
we vacated the injunction, the Board could invalidate her score 
or prevent her from submitting the score to residency 
programs.  See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) 
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 In issuing a preliminary injunction, a district court 
considers four factors:  
 
(1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on 
the merits at final hearing; (2) the extent to which 
the plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the 
conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which 
the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) [that] 
the public interest [weighs in favor of granting 
the injunction].   
Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 
949 F.3d 116, 133 (3d Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve 
Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
 
(explaining that a case is not moot if the parties “‘continue to 
have a personal stake’ in the ultimate disposition of the 
lawsuit” (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 
478 (1990))). 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  
“We employ a tripartite standard of review for . . . preliminary 
injunctions.  We review the District Court’s findings of fact for 
clear error.  Legal conclusions are assessed de novo.  The 
ultimate decision to grant or deny the injunction is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.”  Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 
Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 114 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(omission in original) (quoting K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
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A 
 
 We first address Ramsay’s likelihood of success on the 
merits of her ADA claim.  “On this factor, a sufficient degree 
of success for a strong showing exists if there is a reasonable 
chance or probability, of winning” on her ADA claim.  Ass’n 
of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 
106, 115 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The ADA provides in relevant part:  
 
Any person that offers examinations . . . related 
to applications, licensing, certification, or 
credentialing for . . . professional . . . purposes 
shall offer such examinations . . . in a place and 
manner accessible to persons with disabilities or 
offer alternative accessible arrangements for 
such individuals.   
42 U.S.C. § 12189.  The issue here is whether Ramsay has a 
“disability” that entitles her to an accommodation.  Ramsay, 
2019 WL 7372508, at *8. 
 
 The ADA defines “disability” in relevant part as “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of such individual.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1)(A).  We construe the term “disability” broadly.  Id. 
§ 12102(4)(A).  As to the term “impairment,” the applicable 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regulations6 provide that the 
 
6 In 42 U.S.C. §§ 12186(b) and 12205a, the ADA 
authorizes DOJ to issue regulations implementing the public 
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term “physical or mental impairment” includes ADHD and 
“dyslexia and other specific learning disabilities.”  28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.105(b)(2).  As to “life activities,” the ADA provides that 
“major life activities include . . . reading, concentrating, 
thinking, communicating, and working.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2)(A).  Finally, the regulations explain that “[a]n 
impairment is a disability . . . if it substantially limits the 
ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as 
compared to most people in the general population.”  28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.105(d)(1)(v).  Accordingly, “‘[n]ot every impairment will 
constitute a disability . . . ,’ but [an impairment] will meet the 
definition [of disability] if ‘it substantially limits the ability of 
an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to 
most people in the general population.’”  J.D. by Doherty v. 
Colonial Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663, 670 (4th Cir. 
2019) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.105(d)(1)(v)). 
 
1 
 
 The Board argues that the District Court did not 
determine that Ramsay is substantially limited in comparison 
 
accommodations provisions of the ADA.  Such regulations 
have “the force and effect of law.”  See PDR Network, LLC v. 
Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2055 
(2019) (quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 
97 (2015)); accord Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. United States, 
897 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2018).  The regulations “are entitled 
to substantial deference.”  Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 
331 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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to most people in the general population.7  We first address the 
concept of “most people in the general population” in the 
learning disability context.  In general,  
 
[t]he comparison to most people in the general 
population . . . mean[s] a comparison to other 
people in the general population, not a 
comparison to those similarly situated.  For 
example, the ability of an individual with an 
amputated limb to perform a major life activity 
is compared to other people in the general 
population, not to other amputees.  This does not 
mean that disability cannot be shown where an 
impairment, such as a learning disability, is 
clinically diagnosed based in part on a disparity 
between an individual’s aptitude and that 
individual’s actual versus expected achievement, 
taking into account the person’s chronological 
age, measured intelligence, and age-appropriate 
 
7 Relatedly, the Board argues that the District Court 
improperly considered Ramsay’s work ethic and study habits, 
which the Board argues are improper considerations because 
“working hard does not show that [Ramsay] is substantially 
impaired.”  Appellant’s Br. at 47.  However, “[t]he 
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity shall be made without regard to the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.”  28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.105(d)(1)(viii).  Accordingly, in deciding whether 
Ramsay was disabled, the Court could appropriately consider 
and discount that she compensated for her very weak reading 
and writing abilities by devoting more effort to her assignments 
than most students. 
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education.  Individuals diagnosed with dyslexia 
or other learning disabilities will typically be 
substantially limited in performing activities 
such as learning, reading, and thinking when 
compared to most people in the general 
population . . . .  
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 16,978, 17,009 (Mar. 25, 2011) (explanation by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)); see 
Amendment of Americans with Disabilities Act Title II and 
Title III Regulations to Implement ADA Amendments Act of 
2008, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,204, 53,230 (Aug. 11, 2016) (DOJ 
“concur[ring] with” EEOC’s “view”).8  Thus, a clinical 
diagnosis of a learning disability is typically based upon a 
comparison between the individual and others in the general 
population who are of similar age and have received age-
appropriate education. 
 
 Here, the District Court relied on such diagnostic 
information to conclude that Ramsay had ADHD and dyslexia 
 
8 “[T]he preamble to a regulation may be used as an aid 
in determining the meaning of a regulation.”  Conn. Gen. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 101 F.3d 939, 944 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996)); 
see also Helen Mining Co. v. Dir. OWCP, 650 F.3d 248, 257 
(3d Cir. 2011) (holding that an administrative law judge’s 
“reference to the preamble to the 
regulations . . . unquestionably supports the reasonableness of 
his decision to assign less weight to [an expert’s] opinion”). 
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that caused her to read and write with more difficulty than most 
people.  For example, Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Lewandowski’s 
diagnostic assessments showed that Ramsay had abnormal 
functionalities in thinking, processing speed, attention, and 
sequencing.  Indeed, some of the reading tests Dr. Smith 
administered placed Ramsay in less than the fifth percentile as 
compared to individuals her age.  This is exactly the type of 
data DOJ contemplates as showing a learning disability that 
substantially limits an individual as compared to others in the 
general population.  Equal Employment Provisions, 76 Fed. 
Reg. at 17,009; Title II and Title III Regulations, 81 Fed. Reg. 
at 53,230.  Further, Ramsay explained in her personal 
statement that she had struggled with reading and writing tasks 
in comparison to her classmates since elementary school.  
Thus, the Court’s finding that Ramsay’s ADHD and dyslexia 
constituted a disability was based on evidence that these 
conditions substantially limit her reading and writing in 
comparison to most people.  See Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 
F.3d 448, 453 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (inferring the district court’s 
reasoning where it was “otherwise apparent from the record”).9 
 
 Moreover, the regulations provide that the 
“substantially limits” inquiry “should not demand extensive 
analysis,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.105(d)(1)(ii), and that “[t]he 
comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life 
 
9 We further disagree with the Board’s contention that 
the District Court never found that Ramsay was substantially 
limited as compared to the general population because when 
the Court concluded that Ramsay was disabled, it defined 
disability as a substantial limitation as compared to most 
people in the general population.  Ramsay, 2019 WL 7372508, 
at *7-8. 
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activity to the performance of the same major life activity by 
most people in the general population usually will not require 
scientific, medical, or statistical evidence,” id. 
§ 36.105(d)(1)(vii).  Accordingly, the District Court’s reliance 
on evidence that Ramsay’s reading, processing, and writing 
skills were abnormally low by multiple measures provided a 
sufficient comparison of her abilities to those of the general 
population to support the finding of disability.10 
 
2 
 
 Next, the Board argues that the District Court erred by 
giving “considerable weight” to Ramsay’s past 
accommodations when determining that she has a disability.  
Appellant’s Br. at 45 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(1)(v)).  
According to the Board, a court should consider past 
accommodations only after finding the individual is disabled.  
This argument fails. 
 
The regulation defining disability, § 36.105, does not 
bar consideration of past accommodations.  Indeed, 
 
10 The Board relies on Bibber v. National Board of 
Osteopathic Medical Examiner, Inc., Civ. A. No. 15-4987, 
2016 WL 1404157 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016), but it is 
distinguishable.  There, the district court held that the plaintiff 
was not disabled because “a mountain of evidence,” including 
some of the same diagnostic assessments that Ramsay took, 
“suggest[ed] that Bibber’s reading and processing abilities 
[were] average when compared to the general population.”  Id. 
at *8.  In contrast, Ramsay’s scores on the same assessments 
were lower, and she explained at the hearing how she reads in 
a manner that is different from the average person. 
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§ 36.309(b)(1)(v) provides that “[w]hen considering requests 
for . . . accommodations . . . the [testing] entity gives 
considerable weight to documentation of 
past . . . accommodations.”  Moreover, as the preamble to the 
applicable regulations states, “a recent history of past 
accommodations is critical to an understanding of the 
applicant’s disability and the appropriateness of testing 
accommodations.”  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 
Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial 
Facilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,236, 56,298 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be 
codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36).  Thus, the District Court did not 
err in considering Ramsay’s past accommodations. 
 
3 
 
 The Board also argues that the District Court wrongly 
believed that the statute and regulations compelled it to defer 
to experts who met with and tested Ramsay.  While the Court 
viewed Ramsay’s experts more favorably and found the 
Board’s experts unpersuasive, there is no indication that the 
Court believed that it was compelled to defer to Ramsay’s 
experts.  Rather, the Court discounted the Board’s experts 
because they (1) never met with Ramsay, (2) engaged in too 
demanding an analysis of whether Ramsay had a disability, and 
(3) focused too much on Ramsay’s academic achievements.  
Ramsay, 2019 WL 7372508, at *17-18.  The Court’s reasoning 
was within its discretion and supported by the regulations.   
 
First, it is within the trial judge’s discretion to credit a 
physician with firsthand observations of a patient over one who 
only reviewed the patient’s records.  See United States v. 
Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2009).  Such a 
professional has the benefit of seeing how the patient actually 
17 
 
acts and speaks and provides a perspective not limited to the 
cold record.  This principle is not unlike the deference an 
appellate court gives to a trial court who physically sees a 
witness.  Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1474 (2017).  This 
is why we rarely second-guess a district court’s weighing of 
evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 231 
(3d Cir. 2013), and why it makes sense for the District Court 
to credit the professionals who personally met with Ramsay. 
 
Second, the regulations mandate that “[t]he 
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a 
major life activity requires an individualized assessment.”  28 
C.F.R. § 36.105(d)(1)(vi).  Such assessments benefit from the 
reports of professionals who know or have personally 
examined the individual.  Because such examinations allow the 
professional to evaluate the individual’s behavior, effort, and 
candor, DOJ understandably has stated that “[r]eports from 
experts who have personal familiarity with the candidate 
should take precedence over those from . . . reviewers for 
testing agencies, who have never personally met the candidate 
or conducted the requisite assessments for diagnosis and 
treatment.”  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, 75 
Fed. Reg. at 56,297.  As a result, DOJ has directed that testing 
entities “shall generally accept” “documentation provided by a 
qualified professional who has made an individualized 
assessment of an applicant that supports the need for the 
modification, accommodation, or aid requested . . . and 
provide the accommodation.”  Id.  Thus, the Court’s decision 
18 
 
to weigh Ramsay’s experts more favorably than those of the 
Board was consistent with DOJ regulations.11   
 
Third, “the threshold issue of whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity should not demand 
extensive analysis.”  28 C.F.R. § 36.105(d)(1)(ii).  The Court 
could reasonably have concluded that the Board’s experts were 
too demanding in what they required to prove a disability, for 
example, by demanding evidence of a lifetime of academic 
struggles, and “substituting their own opinions” for those of 
Ramsay’s healthcare providers.  Ramsay, 2019 WL 7372508, 
at *17.  In fact, the Board’s reliance on Ramsay’s academic 
achievement was contrary to the regulations that explain that 
“someone with a learning disability may achieve a high level 
of academic success, but may nevertheless be substantially 
limited in one or more major life activities, including, but not 
limited to, reading, writing, speaking, or learning because of 
the additional time or effort he or she must spend to read, write, 
 
11 The Board argues before us that a 2011 settlement 
agreement between it and DOJ eliminates the preference to be 
given to professionals who personally examined the individual.  
The Board did not make this argument before the District 
Court, so we do not fault the Court for not considering it.  In 
any event, the Board is wrong.  First, the settlement addresses 
the Board’s obligations and not a court’s considerations under 
the regulations when deciding whether an individual has a 
disability.  Second, while the agreement states that the Board 
need not defer to the conclusions of such professionals, that 
does not mean it is relieved of showing in litigation why those 
professionals are unworthy of credence.  Third, even if the 
agreement had any bearing on the regulations, which it does 
not, it expired in 2014.   
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speak, or learn compared to most people.”  28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.105(d)(3)(iii).12  Because Ramsay’s high academic 
performance does not foreclose her from having a disability, 
the Court reasonably discounted the Board’s experts’ opinions, 
which focused mostly on Ramsay’s academic 
accomplishments and ignored evidence of her limitations.  
Ramsay, 2019 WL 7372508, at *18. 
 
 In sum, nothing in the District Court’s discussion 
indicates that it held that the statute and regulations “compel” 
deference to Ramsay’s experts.  Rather, the Court found that 
Ramsay’s experts provided facts more probative to the relevant 
inquiries under the ADA, and its decision to view these 
witnesses more favorably is consistent with the regulations.  
Thus, we will not disturb how the Court chose to weigh 
evidence. 
 
 
12 When discussing this proposition, the Court quoted 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(iii), promulgated by the EEOC, which 
does not implement the operative ADA title here.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12116 (providing EEOC authority to implement the 
employment provisions of the ADA).  Nonetheless, DOJ has 
issued an identical regulation.  Compare 28 C.F.R. 
§ 36.105(d)(3)(iii), with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(4)(iii).  Thus, 
there was no legal error “infecting” the Court’s weighing of 
experts.  Bedrosian v. United States, 912 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 
2018) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset 
Mgmt., LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 968 
n.7 (2018)). 
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 The additional errors the Board identifies in the Court’s 
factual findings do not amount to clear error.  “A finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous when it is completely devoid of 
minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility or bears no rational relationship to the supportive 
evidentiary data.”  VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 
763 F.3d 273, 283 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  We examine the entire record to determine 
whether there is evidentiary support for a finding, not just the 
evidence a district court cites.  See N.J. Rifle, 910 F.3d at 120 
n.24.   
 
 First, the Board argues that the District Court erred in 
finding that the Board’s consultants found that Dr. Smith’s 
assessments were valid and credible.  Contrary to the Board’s 
assertion, the record supports the Court’s finding.  Both of the 
Board’s consultants testified that they had no reason to doubt 
that the assessments were properly administered, that the 
results were accurate, and that the data could be useful, 
although they disagreed with Dr. Smith’s interpretation of the 
results.  The credibility of evidence is different from the 
inferences a factfinder can draw from that evidence, so the 
Court’s finding that all experts agreed the assessments were 
credible was supported by the consultants’ testimony, even if 
the Board’s consultants reached different conclusions from the 
test results themselves.13 
 
13 In making this finding, the District Court misquoted 
one piece of evidence, a letter from the Board.  The Court 
stated that the Board found Ramsay’s expert assessment to be 
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 Second, the Board argues that the District Court erred 
in finding that Ramsay could not finish reading and had to 
guess on about a third of the questions on Step 1 because the 
time Ramsay spent on each question shows that “she had time 
to read every question.”  Appellant’s Br. at 61 (emphasis 
omitted) (citing Ramsay, 2019 WL 7372508, at *3).  The 
record does not contradict the Court’s finding.  The Board’s 
evidence does not indicate how much time Ramsay spent 
reading each question.  Rather, it shows only that she spent, on 
average, seventeen seconds more on the questions she got 
incorrect.  Further, Ramsay testified that she took a pass 
through the questions before answering them, answered the 
ones she felt she could, and repeated that strategy until she was 
left with a few questions she could not answer even after 
multiple reads.  Her strategy provides a reasonable explanation 
for why the time spent on correct versus incorrect answers was 
similar.  The Court was free to credit Ramsay’s testimony over 
the inferences that the Board argued should be drawn from its 
measurements.  See Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. 
Pa. Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 271 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Where 
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” 
(quoting Scully v. US WATS, Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 
2001))). 
 
valid.  Ramsay, 2019 WL 7372508, at *4 (quoting App. 1512).  
The letter, however, was referring to Ramsay’s expert 
accepting the assessments as valid.  Accordingly, the letter 
does not support the Court’s finding because it does not 
embody the Board’s view.  Nonetheless, other evidence in the 
record supports the finding, as explained above, so there is no 
clear error.  N.J. Rifle, 910 F.3d at 120 n.24. 
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 Finally, the Board argues that the District Court erred in 
finding that Ramsay had received informal accommodations in 
her early school years.  Ramsay testified about, and her mother 
relayed to Dr. Smith information concerning, these informal 
accommodations.  While the Board asserts that there is no 
written record of these informal accommodations, Ramsay’s 
corroborated testimony provided “minimum evidentiary 
support” for the Court’s finding, so there was no clear error.14  
VICI Racing, 763 F.3d at 283 (citation omitted). 
 
B 
 
 We next determine whether Ramsay proved irreparable 
harm.  “[T]o show irreparable harm a plaintiff must 
demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a 
legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.”  Acierno v. 
New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  The harm must be 
“likely” to occur “in the absence of an injunction.”  Ferring 
Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 217 n.11 
(3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)).   
 
 The District Court had a basis to conclude that Ramsay 
would be irreparably harmed absent an injunction.  The Court 
could reasonably conclude that given Ramsay’s disability and 
that she had previously failed Step 1, she likely would fail 
 
14 Aside from her mother’s statements to Dr. Smith, 
Ramsay’s report cards from elementary school are also 
consistent with her testimony because her teachers noted she 
needed “help . . . with the switching of letters,” App. 871, and 
“to focus on getting her work done on time,” App. 875. 
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again and be forced to leave medical school.15  Ramsay, 2019 
WL 7372508, at *18.  Her termination from medical school 
and its consequences could not later “be redressed by a legal or 
an equitable remedy.”  Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (citation 
omitted).  No damages remedy is available under the ADA.  42 
U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (providing that the only remedies 
available in an ADA action are those in § 2000a-3(a)); id. 
§ 2000a-3(a) (providing for injunctive relief).  Furthermore, 
because WMed is not a party to this case, the Court could not 
require it to reinstate her, and the Board presents no theory for 
how the Board could redress the termination of Ramsay’s 
medical education.  Moreover, an examiner’s refusal to 
provide accommodations can cause the exam-taker irreparable 
harm because doing so jeopardizes her “opportunity to pursue 
her chosen profession.”  Enyart v. Nat’l Conf. of Bar Exam’rs, 
630 F.3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir. 2011); accord Doe v. Pa. State 
Univ., 276 F. Supp. 3d 300, 313-14 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (holding 
that gap in medical school education and likelihood that the 
student could not gain acceptance to another school constituted 
irreparable harm).  Accordingly, the District Court correctly 
concluded that Ramsay established she would be irreparably 
harmed absent an injunction. 
 
 
15 The letter from WMed provided a basis for the 
District Court to conclude that she would be dismissed from 
the medical school if she did not pass Step 1.  The letter offered 
to extend Ramsay’s leave until “March 2, 2020, with the 
expectation that [she] will sit for the USMLE Step 1 exam in a 
manner that allows [her] to return to” WMed.  App. 1520.  As 
noted above, WMed students must pass Step 1 by the 
beginning of their fourth year.  Thus, to return to school, 
Ramsay had to pass Step 1. 
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C 
 
 We next consider how the District Court “balanc[ed] the 
parties’ relative harms; that is, the potential injury to the 
plaintiff[] without this injunction versus the potential injury to 
the defendant with it in place.”  Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 
847 F.3d 121, 143 (3d Cir. 2017).  In balancing the harms, the 
Court noted the Board’s “concern for the fulfillment of its 
mission to provide [qualified] physicians,” Ramsay, 2019 WL 
7372508, at *19, and that accommodations “can affect the 
comparability of the resulting scores and scores achieved under 
standard testing conditions,” id. at *4 (quoting App. 931).  
Nonetheless, the Court appropriately reasoned that granting a 
preliminary injunction would not undermine the Board’s 
mission because the injunction would give Ramsay only “the 
opportunity to move forward” in her medical career “should 
she succeed in passing her examinations with appropriate 
accommodations.”  Id. at *19 (emphasis omitted).  Moreover, 
the Board’s concerns regarding impacts from undeserved 
accommodations do not apply here because Ramsay has shown 
a reasonable likelihood that she deserves accommodations.  Cf. 
Issa, 847 F.3d at 143 (holding that a defendant could not assert 
an interest in continuing to violate a civil rights statute). 
 
D 
 
 Finally, we consider the District Court’s finding that 
“the public interest favors this preliminary injunction.”  Id.  
The Court concluded that an injunction furthers the public 
interest in ADA compliance and serves to increase the number 
of qualified physicians.  Ramsay, 2019 WL 7372508, at *19.  
We agree.  “In enacting the ADA, Congress demonstrated its 
view that the public has an interest in ensuring the eradication 
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of discrimination on the basis of disabilities.”  Enyart, 630 F.3d 
at 1167; see Issa, 847 F.3d at 143 (concluding that it was in the 
public interest for covered entities to comply with a civil rights 
statute).  Further, the injunction allows Ramsay to continue her 
medical education and therefore serves the public interest in 
training more physicians.  “Although it is true that the public 
also has an interest in ensuring the integrity of licensing 
exams,” Enyart, 630 F.3d at 1167, Ramsay has shown a 
reasonable likelihood that the ADA affords her 
accommodations, and there is no evidence that providing her 
the requested accommodations will jeopardize the test’s 
integrity.  Thus, the public interest weighs in favor of an 
injunction. 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s preliminary injunction.16 
 
16 Given our conclusion that the District Court correctly 
held that Ramsay has shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits of her claim that she has a disability for which she is 
entitled to accommodations, we will affirm the preliminary 
injunction requiring the Board to provide the accommodations 
on Step 2 CK, any written or reading portions of Step 2 CS, 
and Step 3. 
